Defeasible Logic: Agency, Intention and Obligation by Governatori, Guido & Rotolo, Antonino
Defeasible Logic: Agency, Intention and Obligation
Guido Governatori1 and Antonino Rotolo2
1 School of ITEE, The University of Queensland, Australia
2 CIRSFID, University of Bologna, Italy
Abstract. We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal
logic arising from the combination of agency, intention and obligation. We argue
about the defeasible nature of these notions and then we show how to represent
and reason with them in the setting of defeasible logic.
1 Introduction
This paper combine two perspectives: (a) a cognitive account of agents that specifies
motivational attitudes; (b) modelling societies of agents by means of normative con-
cepts [4]. For the first approach, our background is the belief-desire-intention (BDI)
architecture, where mental attitudes are taken as primitives to give rise to a set of In-
tentional Agent Systems [23,2]. This view has been proved to be interesting especially
when the behaviour of agents is the outcome of a rational balance among their (possi-
bly conflicting) mental states [3,24]. The normative aspect is based on some intuitions
about agents and their societies, in which it is assumed that normative concepts play a
decisive role, allowing for the co-ordination of autonomous agents [22,10,12].
Our approach has in general several points of contact with the BOID architec-
ture [4,5,8,6], where a number of strategies are provided for solving conflicts among
informational and motivational attitudes. BOID provides logical criteria (i) to retract
agent’s attitudes with the changing environment, and so (ii) to settle conflicts by stating
different general policies corresponding to the agent type considered. A realistic agent
thus corresponds to a conflict-resolution type in which beliefs override all other factors,
while other agent types, such as simple-minded, selfish or social ones adopt different
orders of overruling. As in the BOID architecture, our system is rule-based. In particu-
lar, it is developed in the setting of Defeasible Logic. All components are represented
as defeasible conditionals. A rule such as p⇒K q means that, given p, this implies
defeasibly agent’s belief that q. Our approach adopts a slightly different perspective.
Our claim is to We develop a constructive account of BDI multi-modal logics where
the rules are meant to devise suitable logical conditions for introducing modalities. If
so, rules may also contain modalised literals, as for example in I p⇒K q, where I is a
BDI operator of intention. In the same spirit, possible conversions of a modality into
another can be accepted, as when the applicability of I p⇒K q may permit to obtain
Iq. Based on this intuitions, our focus will be on Bratman’s [3] concept of policy-based
intention [11]. The relation between mental attitudes and non-monotonicity should not
sound surprising. Recent works by Thomason [27] and on BOID confirm this trend.
Such a connection, with regard to epistemic logics, has already received much attention
in the AI community [19]. However, the notion of defeasibility may play a new role
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within a constructive theory of (modal) operators. As we said, our aim is to show how
to introduce modalities in a (computationally oriented) non-monotonic formalism. In
this way, the notion of defeasible derivability is crucial since rules for mental states and
conditions for derivation involving them allow to introduce modal operators. This ap-
proach is motivated by the inherent computational complexity of multimodal logics [13]
and, often, the notion of modality adopted for agents systems is by its own nature non-
monotonic and so does not lend itself to necessitation [11]. The use of non-monotonic
logics in intention reasoning allows the agent to reason with partial knowledge without
having a complete knowledge of the environment. This also helps the agent in avoiding
a complete knowledge of the consequences. We outline a proof theory whereby one can
reason about ways of maintaining intention consistency in BDI like agent systems. The
new approach facilitates the designer of an agent system like BDI in describing rules
for constructing intentions from goals and goals from knowledge.
BOID system incorporates also obligations. This is crucial in characterising the in-
terplay between internal and external factors. Such intuition is also adopted here and
is framed as well within a non-monotonic setting. Even for this component, the logical
aim is to devise suitable conditions for introducing modalities. Two questions may be
decisive in this regard. First, it would be important to recast the logical nature of oblig-
ations and to investigate how defeasible logic, as described in the following sections,
might capture the well-known defeasible character of deontic reasoning. A full analy-
sis of the above issue is outside the scope of the paper. However, it is at least worth
mentioning that our framework avoids a difficulty that is recognised in the deontic lit-
erature [7]. The source of this difficulty is the closure, classically accepted in Standard
Deontic Logic, of the obligation operator under logical consequence. We simply point
out that these difficulties are avoided by developing a suitable notion of logical deriva-
tion of obligations. In general, with the adoption of this strategy we preserve at least
some basic properties of obligations such as the closure under logical equivalence and
consistency. An important issue concerns the relation between obligations and mental
states. As it is pointed out [5], a number of possible approaches are available. Here we
focus shortly on some minimal principles that emerge from the agent specification ap-
proach considered in [6]. In particular, as argued there, we may adopt, for example, the
schema Op→ I p, or analogous versions for the other mental attitudes. This axiom is
the strong version of intentional norm regimentation as it does not simply prescribe the
consistency between obligations and intentions but states the inclusion of the former in
the latter ones. This of course means that what is not intended is also not obligatory.
Other principles, such as Op→ ¬I¬p, correspond to weak forms of norm regimenta-
tion with regard to agent’s mental states. In this sense, they also express hard constraints
on agent systems. A different principle that regulate the interaction between obligations
and desires may be (Op∧GOAL¬p)→ ¬I¬p. This avoids that the output of a con-
flict between an obligation and a desire is that of adopting a plan for obtaining what is
desired. These principles can be easily encoded in our framework.
Last but not least, our framework is enriched by the notion of modal agency [9]. This
aspect differentiates this system if compared, for example, to BOID architecture. The
same logical strategy—a rule-based approach to introduce modalities—is also applied
to this case. In particular, we will devise a set of rules to encode the action transitions
occurring, under certain circumstances, as the results of actions.
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We will focus on the idea of personal and direct action to realise a state of affairs.
This concept is usually formalised by the well-known modal operator E, such that a
formula like Eip means that the agent i brings it about that p. Different axiomatisations
have been provided for it but almost all include Eip→ p (T, i.e., successfulness), ¬Ei>
(No), (Eip∧ Eiq) → Ei(p∧ q) (C), and are closed under logical equivalence [25,9].
This analysis, however, is here integrated by focusing on the intentional character of
actions. This is done for two reasons. First, in the light of the logical framework we
have defined so far it is interesting to devise criteria for handling the specific interaction
between actions, intentions and the other mental states. Second, the aim is to make
more precise the logical meaning of the notion of direct action. In fact, as found in the
literature [26], it is not possible to capture with E the difference between the modal
qualifications “sees to it” and “brings it about”. Both are usually represented by this
modal operator, despite the fact that the former expression exhibits a clear intentional
character, whereas the latter may refer as well to unintentional actions [14]. Thus we
introduce the operator Z to express intentional actions. It is characterised by all basic
properties of E plus the schema Zp→ I p, which cannot be in general valid for E.
The interest of adding agency to a framework that includes cognitive states and
obligations is evident. First, the simple combination of agency and deontic operators
makes possible a more accurate representation of obligations directed to agents’ be-
haviour, such as in the case of OZp. In addition, it allows to express the creation of
obligations, as in ZOp. As regards handling conflicts between rules, new possible types
of agents can be defined, according to the order of overruling we want to adopt. In this
perspective, forms of regimentation may be introduced especially for the operator Z.
Finally, it is possible to embed in the system a number of interesting properties, such
as ZOp→ I p, which completes what is stated by a reasonable and analogous schema
without the operator of agency, namely, IOp→ I p.
Finally, a few notes on the meaning of rules for obligation, which emerge from fo-
cusing on their interplay with the other components we have described so far. If rules
define the conditions for the introduction of modal operators, when we deal with oblig-
ations defeated by other components we may in fact adopt two different views. Suppose
we have two rules like r1 : p⇒Z q (a rule for action) and r2 : s⇒O ¬q (a rule for oblig-
ation). Both are applicable and r1 defeats r2. If so we cannot derive ¬q via r2 and so
O¬q. In a first interpretation (applicability-based obligation), that a rule for action (but
the same applies to other components such as beliefs) collides with a rule for obligation
means that a normative violation has occurred [4]. But if r1 prevails, in our setting we
cannot argue in favour of the occurrence of O¬q. On the other hand, a violation of an
obligation does not imply the cancellation of such an obligation [28]. The obligation
is still in force. This means that the existence of the actual obligation O¬q depends on
the applicability of r2, independently of the effective derivation of its consequent. In a
second interpretation (pure-derivability-based obligation) the existence of actual oblig-
ations depends on the effective derivation of the consequent of a rule. In this case we
can argue as follows. On the one hand, the non-derivation of O¬q means that, as soon
as a violation occurs, r2 is nothing but a special kind of prima facie obligation: when
violated, it does not make sense to deduce its consequent as a real obligation. On the
other, and more radically, since the obligations that count in the system are those which
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are derivable, we may say that, in the event the action of the agent blocks the inference
of O¬q, the agent is a sort of legislator within the system; similar considerations apply
to when intentions override obligations.
2 Basic Defeasible Logic of Agency, Intention and Obligation
Usually modal logics are extensions of classical propositional logic with some inten-
sional operators. Thus any classical (normal) modal logic should account for two com-
ponents: (1) the underlying logical structure of the propositional base and (2) the logic
behaviour of the modal operators. Alas, as is well-known, classical propositional logic
is not well suited to deal with real life scenarios. The main reason is that the descriptions
of real-life cases are, very often, partial and somewhat unreliable. In such circumstances
classical propositional logic might produce counterintuitive results insofar as it requires
complete, consistent and reliable information. Hence any modal logic based on classi-
cal propositional logic is doomed to suffer from the same problems. On the other hand
the logic should specify how modalities can be introduced and manipulated. Common
rules for modalities are necessitation and RM. Consider the necessitation rule of nor-
mal modal logic which dictates the condition that an agent knows all the valid formulas
and thereby all the tautologies. Such a formalisation might suit for the knowledge an
agent has but definitely not for the intention part and, consequently, not for a logic
of intentional agency. Furthermore, many authors have expressed concerns about the
meaningfulness of O>. Moreover, an agent need not be intending all the consequences
of a particular action it does. It might be the case that it is not confident of them being
successful. Thus the two rules are not appropriate for a logic of deontic agency. A logic
of deontic agency should take care of the underlying principles governing the intention
and the action of an agent. It should have a notion of the direct and indirect knowledge
of the agent, where the former relates to facts as literals whereas the latter to that of the
agent’s theory of the world in the form of rules. Similarly the logic should also be able
to account for general intentions as well as the policy-based (derived ones) intentions of
the agent. Finally it should offer facilities to describe obligations and the relationships
between the various modalities.
These are in short the main guidelines we will follow in this and the subsequent
sections to develop a suitable framework to deal with agency, intention and obligation
components. As we have argued so far, reasoning about intentions and other mental
attitudes has a defeasible nature, and defeasibility is one of the proper characteristic
of normative reasoning. Thus any system that aims at the integration of intentions and
obligations, for example a multi-agent system, should cater for defeasibility. The two
phenomena (mental attitudes and deontic notions) are both subject to defeasibility, but
they might obey different and sometimes incompatible intuitions; thus we need a non-
monotonic formalism that is able to deal with them in a flexible, efficient and modular
way and should offers itself to a seamless integration of the relevant modal operators.
Moreover we need an efficient and easily implementable system to capture the required
defeasible instances.
Defeasible logic, as developed by Nute [20] with a particular concern about com-
putational efficiency and developed over the years by [17,1], is our choice. The reason
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being ease of implementation [18], flexibility [1] (it has a constructively defined and
easy to use proof theory which allows us to capture a number of different intuitions
of non-monotonicity) and it is efficient: it is possible to compute the complete set of
consequences of a given theory in linear time [16].
A defeasible theory contains five different kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules,
defeasible rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation. In this section we consider only
essentially propositional rules. Rules containing free variables are interpreted as the set
of their variable-free instances.
Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “John is a minor”. In the logic, this
might be expressed as minor(John).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable
(e.g., facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “every minor is a
person”. Written formally: minor(X)→ person(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of
such a rule is “every person has the capacity to perform legal acts to the extent that the
law does not provide otherwise”; written formally: person(X)⇒ hasLegalCapacity(X).
The idea is that if we know that someone is a person, then we may conclude that he/she
has legal capacity unless there is other evidence suggesting that h/she may not have.
Defeaters are a special kind of rules. They are used to prevent conclusions not to
support them. For example: WeakEvidence; ¬guilty This rule states that if pieces of
evidence are assessed as weak, then they can prevent the derivation of a “guilty” verdict;
on the other hand they cannot be used to support a “not guilty” conclusion.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that
is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the
defeasible rules
r : person(X)⇒ hasLegalCapacity(X)
r′ : minor(X)⇒¬hasLegalCapacity(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a
minor has legal capacity. But if we introduce a superiority relation > with r′ > r, then
we can indeed conclude that the minor does not have legal capacity.
A rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r) (A(r) may be omitted if it is the
empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent (or head) C(r)
which is a literal. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs,
the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd ,
and the set of defeaters in R by Rd f t . R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent
q. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then
∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p).
A defeasible theory D is a structure (F,RK ,RI ,RZ ,RO,>) where F is a finite set of
facts; RK , RI , RZ and RO are, respectively, finite set of rules (strict, defeasible rules and
defeaters) for knowledge, intentions, agency, and obligations; and >, the superiority
relation, is a binary relation over the set of rules (i.e., >⊆ (RK ∪RI ∪RZ ∪RO)2).
Intuitively, given an agent, F consists of the information the agent has about the
world, its immediate intentions, its actions and the absolute obligations; RK corresponds
to the agent’s theory of the world, while RZ , RI and RO encode its actions, policy, and
normative system; > captures the strategy of the agent (or its preferences). The policy
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part of a defeasible theory capture both intentions and goals. The main difference is
the way the agent perceives them: goals are possible outcomes of a given context while
intentions are the actual goals the agent tries to achieve in the actual situation. In other
words goals are the choices an agent has and intentions are the chosen goals; in case of
conflicting goals (policies) the agent has to evaluate the pros and cons and then decide
according to its aims (preferences), which are encoded by the superiority relation.
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four forms:
+∆q meaning that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using only facts and strict
rules).
−∆q meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Over the years a number of formulations of the proof theory of defeasible logic have
been proposed (sometimes for variants of defeasible logic); here we will adopt the meta-
program formalisation of [17].
The meta-programM assumes that the predicates, fact(Head), superior(Rule1,
Rule2), strict(Name, Operator, Head, Body), defeasible(Name, Operator,
Head, Body), and defeater(Name, Operator, Head, Body), which are used to rep-
resent a defeasible theory, are defined. The interpretation of the basic predicates of the
meta-program is as follows:
fact(p) iff p ∈ F
strict(r, m, p, [a1, . . . ,an]) iff r : a1, . . . ,an →m p ∈ Rs[p]
defeasible(r, m, p, [a1, . . . ,an]) iff r : a1, . . . ,an ⇒m p ∈ Rd [p]
defeater(r, m, p, [a1, . . . ,an]) iff r : a1, . . . ,an;m p ∈ Rd f t [p]
superior(r, s) iff r > s
According to the above predicates we introduce the definition of a rule.
rule(R, X, P, [A1,...,An]):- strict(R, X, P, [A1,...,An]).
rule(R, X, P, [A1,...,An]):- defeasible(R, X, P, [A1,...,An]).
rule(R, X, P, [A1,...,An]):- defeater(R, X, P, [A1,...,An]).
We are now ready for the clause defining the meta-program describing the proof-theory
of defeasible logic.3 If we disregard the modal operator it is immediate to see that
the following meta-program has the same structure as the meta-programs given for
propositional defeasible logic in [1,17]. Essentially we have four (independent) copies
of the same meta-program, one for each modality.
3 We have permitted ourselves some syntactic flexibility in presenting the meta-program. How-
ever, there is no technical difficulty in using conventional logic programming syntax to repre-
sent this program. As usual with logic programming capital letters stand for variables, however
we reserve K,O, I and Z for modalities, and we will use X, Y, W for variables ranging over modal
operators.
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strictly(P, K):- fact(P).
strictly(P, X):- fact(XP).
strictly(P, X):- strict(R, X, P, [A1,...,An,Y1B1,...,YmBm]),
strictly(A1, K), ..., strictly(An, K),
strictly(B1, Y1), ..., strictly(Bm, Ym).
The first two clauses establish that a conclusion in strictly provable if it is one of the
facts, while the third corresponds to modus ponens for strict rules and strictly derivable
literals. Notice that the first clause is relative to rule for knowledge; as we have argued
before the rules in RK are used to encode the description of the environment (and there
is no modal operator K!). Thus unmodalized literals can be thought of as prefixed by a
virtual K modal operator.
defeasibly(P, X):- strictly(P, X).
defeasibly(P, X):- consistent(P, X),
supported(R, X, P),
not defeated(P, X, S).
consistent(P, X):- not strictly(∼P, X).
defeated(P, X, S):- applicable(S, X, ∼P),
not overruled(∼P, X, T, S).
overruled(P, X, T, S):- supported(T, X, P),
superior(T, S).
applicable(R, X, P):- rule(R, X, P, [A1,...,An,Y1B1,...,YmBm]),
defeasibly(A1, K), ..., defeasibly(An, K),
defeasibly(B1, Y1), ..., defeasibly(Bm, Ym).
supported(R, X, P):- rule(R, X, P, [A1,...,An,Y1B1,...,YmBm]),
defeasibly(A1, K), ..., defeasibly(An, K),
defeasibly(B1, Y1), ..., defeasibly(Bm, Ym).
not defeater(R, X, P, [A1,...,An,Y1B1,...,YmBm]).
The first clause allows the transformation of a strict conclusion in a defeasible conclu-
sion. A defeasible derivation of a literal p consists of three phases. In the first phase we
establish that the opposite literal is not strictly provable and then have to provide an ap-
plicable supportive rule for p (i.e., using the predicate supported(r, p), where r is a
supportive rule for p), then in the second phase we build all possible counterarguments
against p (i.e., defeated(p, s)meaning that the literal p is defeated by rule s) and we
have to verify that the conclusion is not defeated by the attacking arguments, so we try
to rebut the counterarguments (i.e., overruled(∼p, t, s)) by stronger arguments
for the intended conclusion.
The relationship between proof tags on one hand and the predicates strictly and
defeasibly on the other is as follows:
D `+∆X p iff M ` strictly(p,X) D ` −∆X p iff M ` not strictly(p,X)
D `+∂X p iff M ` defeasibly(p,X) D ` −∂X p iff M ` not defeasibly(p,X)
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Let us consider a theory where F = {Ia,b,Od,e} and R = {Ia,b⇒Z c; e,Zc⇒O f}.
Here we can prove +∂Ia, +∂Kb, +∂Ke and +∂Od since they are facts. Then the first
rule is applicable and we can derive+∂Zc, and now the second rule is applicable and we
obtain +∂O f . If we replace the first rule with Ia,b⇒K c we conclude +∂Kc instead of
+∂Kc and now the second rule is no longer applicable. We illustrate the theory with the
help of a concrete example. A drunk surgeon intends to operate a patient. The surgeon is
aware that operating under the influence of alcohol will result in a failure. Moreover the
legal system under which the surgeon operates prescribes that people causing permanent
damages as a result of negligence are responsible. Thus the two rules can be rewritten,
respectively as
I(opearate), drunk⇒Z f ail
permanentDamages, Z( f ail)⇒O responsible
The conclusion is that the surgeon is responsible, because the damages are the result of
an intentional negligence. What about when the surgeon, not on duty and he happens
to be the only person able to complete the required medical procedure, is drunk and the
patient will die without the operation? The surgeon knows that the patient will suffer
permanent damages as a result of the operation, but he operates anyway. In this case we
have to change the first rule in I(operate), drunk⇒K f ail. Here we derive +∂K f ail
instead of +∂Z f ail, and thus we block the application of the second rule. Hence we
cannot conclude that the surgeon is responsible.
3 Interaction among Agency, Intention and Obligation
The program given in the previous section does not account for the properties of the
modal operators and their mutual relationships. For these we have to introduce more
clauses in the meta-program.
strictly(P, K):- strictly(P, Z).
defeasibly(P, K):- defeasibly(P, Z).
These two clauses enable us to convert a conclusion in Z in a conclusion in K, and thus
they mimic the successfulness of the modal operator Z.
Let us see now the relationship between the different kinds of rule we have intro-
duced so far. Table 1 shows all possible cases and, for each kind of rule, indicates all
potential attacks on it. Since we have defined four kinds of rules, we have to analyse
twelve combinations, which are gathered in the table in six columns. Each column cor-
responds to a type of potential attack, such that the second rule placed in each box is
nothing but the potential attack on the first one. If the potential attack fails, since the
superiority does not play here any role, this means that the case at stake does not corre-
spond to a real attack: The type of rule that wins does so in any case and independently
of inspecting the strength of the rules involved (i.e., without considering superiority
relation). To represent the possible attacks we have to strengthen the definitions of the
predicate consistent.
consistent(P, X):- not strictly(∼P, K),
not strictly(∼P, Y1), ..., not strictly(∼P, Yn).
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⇒K p ⇒K p ⇒K p ⇒I p ⇒O p ⇒O p
⇒O ∼p ⇒I ∼p ⇒Z ∼p ⇒Z ∼p ⇒I ∼p ⇒Z ∼p
+∂K p +∂K p −∂K p −∂I p type of agent type of agent
⇒O p ⇒I p ⇒Z p ⇒Z p ⇒I p ⇒Z p
⇒K ∼p ⇒K ∼p ⇒K ∼p ⇒I ∼p ⇒O ∼p ⇒O ∼p
−∂Op −∂I p −∂Z p −∂Z p type of agent type of agent
Table 1. Basic Attacks
where Y1, . . . ,Yn are the modalities that attack the modality X , according to Table 1. At
the same time, we have to allow more types of rule in the attack phase.
applicable(R, X, P):- rule(R, Y, P, [A1,...,An,W1B1,...,WmBm]) ,
defeasibly(A1, K), ..., defeasibly(An, K),
defeasibly(B1, W1), ..., defeasibly(Bm, Wm).
This clause is required for all Y that attack X in Table 1. Moreover, if Y = Z we have to
include, due to the successfulness of the operator, the additional clause
applicable(R, X, P):- rule(R, Z ∼XP, [A1,...,An,Y1B1,...,YmBm]) ,
defeasibly(A1, K), ..., defeasibly(An, K),
defeasibly(B1, Y1), ..., defeasibly(Bm, Ym).
Table 1 (and, as we shall see, Tables 2 and 3) provides some basic criteria for classi-
fying cognitive agents [8,4]. The general assumption of Table 1 is to deal with realistic
agents. In other words, we set criteria for solving conflicts in which beliefs in gen-
eral override the other components. In fact, our approach considers epistemic rules as
agent’s basic principles of rationality about the world. The only exception to this view
is that rules for action may attack rules for belief, since the former ones capture the
mechanism that governs the factual results of (intentional) actions. We can speak in this
case of quasi-realistic agents since, given a certain belief, a contrary evidence based on
rules for action may prove that such a belief is false. Given this background, Tables 2
and 3 will consider other agent’s types, such as selfish and social, plus further speci-
fications deriving from more articulated criteria for solving conflicts. As we shall see,
the double reading assigned to the rules for obligation will allow us to provide an alter-
native interpretation of some already established criteria for handling conflicts between
deontic factors, on one hand, and mental as well as action components, on the other.
Let us focus on some examples for each type of potential attack described in Ta-
ble 1. Suppose we have (first column from the left) r1 : forest,dry,spark⇒K fire and
r2 : forest⇒O ¬fire. It is clear that rule r2 does not determine a real attack on r1. Since
we assume the agent is realistic, rule r1 is nothing but a principle of rationality of the
agent: It says that a fire is (defeasibly) the consequence of a spark in a dry forest. Rules
like r1 must prevail with regard to deontic rules, such as r2 that prohibits to light a fire
in a forest. When r1 is attacked by r2, the output that follows from r1 is not affected by
this attack and the fire should be obtained since this fact is independent from any rule
that forbids to light fires in the forest. Vice versa, the derivation of the obligation not
to light a fire is blocked since such an obligation is meaningless when the conditions
for r1 occur: Of course, r2 does not apply when fire is obtained according to agent’s
rationality.
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Similar remarks apply to the case that involves rules for knowledge and intention
(second column). Let us consider the rule r3 : cautious⇒I ¬fire. Even here it is rea-
sonable to argue in favour of r1. Although agent’s being cautious means to intend not
to light a fire, this intention does not necessarily override r1, namely the fact, according
to agent’s knowledge, that a spark normally causes a fire in a dry forest. This means
that, when r3 attacks r1, the consequent of the latter must be obtained, while the re-
verse attack should prevent to get I¬fire since such an intention is meaningless when
the agent assumes rationally that the fire must spread through the forest. Different ar-
guments may be put forward when a rule for action, r4 : protect spark ⇒Z ¬fire, is
considered in combination with r1. Rule r4 states the fact that fire obtains and may be
viewed as a (factual) contrary evidence with regard to r1. In general, rules like p⇒Z q
say that a specific action preformed by agent, under certain circumstances, defeasibly
determines through such action the occurrence of q, and so that Zq. The applicability
of these rules may thus be a factual and contrary evidence with respect to K-rules that
would allow to infer ¬q. For similar (but opposite) reasons, the reverse attack (r1 on r4)
should block the derivation of ¬fire.
Since we assume the rationality of the agent with regard to its knowledge about
the world, we have set that rules for knowledge be greater in strength with regard to
rules for obligation and intention. Actions may override knowledge while mutual at-
tacks involving intentions and actions determine real attacks for the trivial reason that
actions are intentional in character. It is obvious that, when we have a rule such as
r5 : incautious⇒I fire, the attack of r5 on r4 prevents from obtaining ¬fire while the re-
verse attack blocks the derivation of fire: Actions defined by rules for Z are intentional.
On the other hand, as we have indicated in Table 1, the interplay between oblig-
ations, intentions and actions cannot be settled so easily. In the light of well-known
distinctions among different kinds of agent, Table 2 summarises all combinations re-
lated to the cases indicated in Table 1, first and second columns from the right. Let
⇒O p/⇒I ∼p ⇒O p/⇒Z ∼p
+∂Op +∂I∼p Independent +∂Op +∂Z∼p Strongly independent
+∂Op −∂I∼p Strongly social +∂Op −∂Z∼p Social
−∂Op +∂I∼p Selfish −∂Op +∂Z∼p Strongly selfish
−∂Op −∂I∼p Strongly pragmatic −∂Op −∂Z∼p Pragmatic
Table 2. Type of Agent: Basic Attacks
us provide some brief comments. Independent and strongly independent agents are free
respectively to adopt intentions and to perform intentional actions in conflict with oblig-
ations. In particular, within a pure-derivability-based interpretation of obligations (see
Section 1), strongly independent agents may correspond to true cases of normative vi-
olation, since the actual obligation is derived in presence of a contrary action. As ex-
pected, for social and strongly social agents obligations override rules for action and
for intention. In addition to the standard view [4], the overruling of intentions or actions
with regard to obligations may configure a case of agent legislator, when, within a pure-
derivability-based interpretation, only derived obligations count as such in the system.
Pragmatic and strongly pragmatic are cases where no derivation is possible and so the
124 Guido Governatori and Antonino Rotolo
agent’s behaviour is open to any other course of action other than those specified in the
rules considered. To illustrate the potential conflicts between obligations and intentional
acts we examine the well-known prisoner dilemma. Two people are arrested for a major
crime, however the police does not have enough evidence to incriminate them, but they
can be charged with and convicted for a minor crime. However if one of them confesses
the crime she will be sentenced to one year and the other to twenty-five years. If both
confess they will be imprisoned for ten years each. Finally if none of them confesses
then they have to serve for three years each. The two criminals are part of a criminal
organisation renowned for its code of honour that prescribes to not betray your fellows.
The best individual outcome is to confess the crime, while the best outcome according
to the organisation code is not confessing it. Hence this situation can be represented by
the following theory:
⇒Z con f ess ⇒O ¬con f ess
A “selfish criminal” will confess (+∂Zcon f ess, −∂O¬con f ess), giving thus priority to
his welfare, while a “social criminal” will stick with the code of honour and will not
confess the crime (+∂O¬con f ess, −∂Zcon f ess).
Table 2 does not cover all possible types of agent. In fact, the focus is there on
possible attacks that involve only two rules. Table 3 completes the scenario and provides
all possible combinations when we deal with three rules. It is worth noting that we
consider only the case with⇒O p,⇒I ∼p and⇒Z ∼p: The case with⇒I ∼p and⇒Z p
is meaningless since rules for Z govern only intentional actions. For similar reasons,
some combinations in Table 3 are excluded (as highlighted by adding three question
marks). Some comments on Table 3. Strongly independent agents are basically as in
⇒O p/⇒Z ∼p/⇒I ∼p
+∂Op +∂Z∼p +∂I∼p Strongly independent
+∂Op +∂Z∼p −∂I∼p ???
+∂Op −∂Z∼p +∂I∼p Selfish saint
+∂Op −∂Z∼p −∂I∼p Hypersocial
−∂Op +∂Z∼p +∂I∼p Sinner
−∂Op +∂Z∼p −∂I∼p ???
−∂Op −∂Z∼p +∂I∼p Social sinner
−∂Op −∂Z∼p −∂I∼p Hyperpragmatic
Table 3. Type of Agent: Other Attacks
Table 2 because Z implies I. The types hypersocial and hyperpragmatic do not add
conceptually anything with respect to their corresponding and weaker versions of Table
2. The new cases are the selfish saint, sinner and social sinner types. The first is given
when the content of agent’s intention is in conflict with an obligation, but no intentional
action to realise such a content is performed. The sinner performs this action and, in
parallel, the obligation is defeated. The social sinner has this intention, the derivation of
the obligation is blocked but no violating action is performed. Once again, notice that
sinner and social sinner may viewed, within a pure-derivability-based interpretation, as
peculiar cases of legislator.
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Another interesting feature that could be explained using our formalism is that of
rule conversion. For instance, suppose that a rule of a specific type is given and also
suppose that all the literals in the antecedent of the rule are provable in one and the
same modality. If so, it is possible to argue that the conclusion of the rule inherits the
modality of the antecedent. To give an example let p,q⇒K r denote that an agent knows
r given p and q (or r is a consequence of p and q). Now suppose I(p) and I(q) are given.
Can we conclude I(r)? Here we should be careful about the interpretation of the rules
as p→K q (q is a consequence of p), p⇒O q (given p, q is obligatory), p⇒I q (given
p the agent has the intention q), and p⇒Z q (given p the agent sees to it that q).
The adoption of conversions should not sound strange. In many formalisms it is
possible to convert from one type of conclusion into a different one. Take for example
the right weakening rule of non-monotonic consequence relations, where B ` C and
A |∼B imply A |∼C (see, e.g., [15]). In other words, it allows the combination of non-
monotonic consequence with classical consequences. While not every combination of
obligations and mental attitudes or action concepts will produce meaningful results for
the conversion, some of them can prove useful in the present context. For example if
we want to convert rules for knowledge/belief into rules for obligations we have to de-
termine conditions under which a rule for knowledge can be used to directly derive an
obligation. The condition we have after is that all the antecedents on the rule can be
shown to be obligatory. In general, when we admit conversion of rules, the situation is
such that when given environmental conditions are satisfied a rule for X is transformed
in a rule for Y ; accordingly we have to use the “transformed” rule both in the support
and attack phases. The conditions under which a rule can be converted are that all im-
personal literals are (defeasibly) provable in K and all personal literals are (defeasibly)
provable in the modalities required by the conversion (see Table 4). Formally we have
supported(R, X, P):- rule(R, Y, P, [A1,...,An]),
environment(A1, W), ..., environment(An, W),
not defeater(R, X, P, [A1,...,An]).
applicable(R, X, P):- rule(R, Y, P, [A1,...,An]),
environment(A1, W), ..., environment(An, W),
where
environment(P, X):- personal(P), defeasibly(P, X).
environment(P, X):- not personal(P), defeasibly(P, K).
The relationships among the modalities X , Y andW are described in Table 44. Notice
that not all cases in the Table 4 can be accepted for all types of agents: the first column
4 Table 4 should be read as follows. The first and second columns indicate the modal quali-
fications of the antecedents of a rule. The third column specifies the type of rule while the
fourth provides the possible modal qualification we may obtain in the light of the antecedents
and the rule type. Fifth columns says whether the corresponding conversion holds in all cases
or characterises only some particular agent types. For example (fourth row from the top), if
Zp, Iq⇒K r is applicable we may obtain+∂Ir. On the other hand, the derivation of+∂Ir from
I p, Iq⇒O r is possible only if we assume a kind of norm regimentation, with which we impose
that all agents intend what is prescribed by deontic rules.
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from the right indicates new types of agent corresponding to each rule conversion. This
is particularly evident when obligations, actions and intentions are considered. Other
combinations than those here defined are possible but they are problematic. As we can
X Y ⇒ W
O O K O For all agents
I I K I For all agents
Z Z K Z For all agents
Z I K I For all agents
I I O I quasi-intentional-regimentation
Z Z O I quasi-intentional-regimentation
Z Z O Z quasi-behavioural-regimentation
Z I O I quasi-intentional-regimentation
I I Z I For all agents
O O Z O For all agents
I O Z I quasi-socio-intentional-regimentation
Table 4. Conversions
see, some of the conversions above logically characterise new types of agents. Let us
focus on them. All these types correspond to weak versions of strong norm regimenta-
tion. Strong regimentation, as maintained in [6], corresponds to adopting schemata like
Op→ BELp. The just mentioned conversions configure weak forms of regimentation.
For instance, the conversion described in the fifth row from the top. Roughly speaking,
if we want to give an intuitive reading we could conceive it as follows: I p andO(p→ q)
entail Iq. Let us see with a concrete example the meaning of some conversions. The Yale
Shooting Problem can be described as follows5
liveAmmo, load,shoot⇒K kill
This rule encodes the knowledge of an agent that knows that loading the gun with live
ammunitions, and then shooting will kill her friend. This example clearly shows that the
qualification of the conclusions depends on the modalities relative to the individual acts
“load” and “shoot”. If the agent intends to load and shoot the gun (I(load), I(shoot)),
then, since she knows that the consequence of these actions is the death of her friend,
she intends to kill him (+∂Ikill). Similarly if she intentionally loads the gun and intends
to shoot (Z(load), I(shoot)). To intentionally killing him she has to load and to shoot
the gun intentionally (Z(load), Z(shoot)). If she intentionally loads the gun (Z(load))
and accidentally shoots it (shoot), she kills the friend (+∂Kkill) but this is not an in-
tentional act (−∂Zkill), since not all the actions leading to this dramatic conclusion are
intentional. Finally in the case she has the intention to load the gun (+∂I load) and then
for some reason shoot it (shoot), then the friend is still alive (−∂Kkill).
So far we have only examined cases where we pass from a single modality to a dif-
ferent modality. However axioms ZOp→ I p and IOp→ I p provide modal reductions.
These principles can be described in the meta-program by the following clause
5 Here we will ignore all temporal aspects and we will assume that the sequence of actions is
done in the correct order.
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defeasibly(P, I):- defeasibly(OP, Z).
defeasibly(P, I):- defeasibly(OP, I).
Moreover we have to add clauses for applicable and supported where we consider
rules for Z and I with conclusion Op when rules for I with conclusion p/∼p are admis-
sible.
4 Related and Future Work
Let us sketch just some short conclusions, also for future research.
Nute [21] proposed a Deontic Defeasible Logic which, in some respect, is similar to
the framework presented here. Beside some minor differences in the way rules are han-
dled at the propositional level, the main difference is that he uses only one type of rule.
Traditionally, in proof-theory, rules to introduce operators give the meaning of them.
Thus using one and the same type of rule both for obligation and factual conclusion
does not show the real meaning of the operators involved. Moreover it is not clear to
us whether and how complex conversions and reductions can be dealt with in a system
with only a single type of rules.
As we said, another reference of this paper is to BOID. Its calculation scheme is
similar to the one proposed here. For example, as in BOID it is possible to state gen-
eral orders of overruling but also local preferences involving single rules. This last job
is made here by means of the superiority relation. However, our system, which also
deals with agency, is designed to take care of modalised literals and modal conversions.
This is due to the logical task assigned to the rules. For this reason, but in a different
perspective, our logical view may be also useful to study the notion of negative per-
mission. In fact, conditions for ∂Op may also determine the implicit introduction of a
modal operator of permission in terms of non-derivability of an obligation.
As regards the complexity of the system, [16] has proved, for the propositional case,
that the set of tagged literals can be derived from the theory in linear time in the number
of rules in it. It is not hard to extend this result to the modal case. The distinction of
different kinds of rules does not affect the complexity of the theory. The case for K
is the same adopted in standard Defeasible Logic while, for the other components, we
convert relevant rules into the appropriate “extended” modal literals. At this point, the
inference mechanism is the same as the standard one.
Due to space limitations it was not possible to show how to model other notions of
agency—such as capability (both practical [9] and deontic [12]), attempt, and so on—
that have received some attention in the literature in the past few years. Here it suffices
to say that those notions can be easily represented (modularly) by adopting a strategy
similar to that used in [11] to derive goals from intentions in a BDI defeasible logic.
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